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Abstract
In networked markets, information can help firms
make better decisions on which market (platform), and
how much, to participate. However, these markets may
be temporally separated, e.g., independent system op-
erators in different geographical locations. We model
these via networked Cournot markets, but instead con-
sider the participation of one firm to either be with the
realization (or full information) of a random market, or
only with the statistics of the random market, modeled by
an additive zero-mean random variable on the maximal
price. We show that firms not knowing the realization
of the random variable would participate in both mar-
kets in the same way as if the mean was realized. We
then present global effects: we prove that profit is im-
proved for every firm when one’s information improves
but social welfare may get better or worst with more in-
formation.
1. Introduction
Markets are increasingly spatially connected and
with efficient supply chain, producers now reach far and
wide to a multitude of consumers and are no longer re-
stricted to their own local consumers. Furthermore, plat-
forms such as eBay and Uber [1] help to connect such
firms to markets in this connected system and guide con-
sumers and producers to make efficient decisions.
Uber assigns price surges in certain geographical re-
gions to ensure that supply is given incentives to meet
demand in an efficient manner [2]. Independent System
Operators (ISOs) play a similar role in the power mar-
ket and provide incentives to the different participants to
maintain a tradeoff between socially efficient trades and
stability in the system [3, 4], achieving frequency regu-
lation and power line limits as well as maximizing social
welfare.
To improve efficiency of the grid, many works sug-
gest platforms [5] like Uber or Airbnb for the grid,
where benefits include, e.g., an increased participation
due to small providers such as distributed energy re-
sources (DERs) such as solar, wind, but also controllable
load owners such as smart appliances. The increase in
DERs would help the grid and its participants as well in
terms of line management [6] and in terms of cost, where
the locational marginal prices are less likely to increase
since there is less congested power lines. Another possi-
ble benefit is the increased ability to perform frequency
regulation [7] using the enhanced level of controllable
load participation. Other benefits include more compet-
itive prices, and improved economic efficiency.
Besides being spatially (or geographically) con-
nected, some markets are also temporally connected,
and often decisions need to be made at different time
epochs (possibly due to different timezones because of
difference in geographical locations) and therefore may
not always be in a scenario where full information is
available. One example is in the electricity market
where a DER owner has to decide whether to supply
to the current demand or at a later time or different geo-
graphical market, where the information in the later time
or the later market may not available in full. In such
cases, it is important to understand how the lack of full
information in later markets (or designed platforms) af-
fects the behavior of less-informed participants, as well
as the other players in the system.
There are two extreme models: (i) to consider the
two markets separately, and (ii) to assume that the firm is
able to participate in both markets simultaneously with
perfect information. While these two extremes represent
possible scenarios, we would like our proposed model to
generalize in terms of the amount of information a firm
has on the later market.
A potential resolution is to have a statistic on the later
market and make an optimal decision on how to par-
ticipate in the current market, given the statistic on the
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later market and its participants. Potentially, the more
informed a firm is, the lower the variance of its corre-
sponding statistic on the market, and the better the de-
cision it makes. We will show that the above is true,
and also, that when the participant has greater informa-
tion, competition across the system improves in the right
direction, and the expected revenue of every player in-
creases.
1.1 Networked Cournot Markets
Competition is no longer in a single, well-defined
market scenario and analysis of markets have also
shifted towards networked markets, where firms partici-
pate in multiple markets simultaneously.
One of the networked competition models that has
been well studied [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] lately is the net-
worked Cournot competition. Cournot competition, in
contrast to competition by price (Bertrand Competition),
competes by choosing quantities, and the eventual price
is determined by the aggregate supply in each market.
Another motivation of networked Cournot market is
that bidding processes in power markets are similar to
Cournot competition and as such, the Cournot model is
also adopted in the electricity market literature [13].
Furthermore, under mild assumptions, networked
Cournot competition admits a unique Nash equilibrium
[8, 9] and is an ordinal potential game in which the Nash
equilibrium can be obtained via a convex optimization
procedure that has polynomial time complexity [9].
There is no consideration of the temporal factor in-
volved in previous works, and they often assume that
price scenarios remain constant across time, and do not
change. We introduce, in this work, stochasticity in the
market, modeling potential lack of information for the
firms able to participate in both markets.
1.2 Power Markets and Second Chance
Due to different timezones, power markets in dis-
tant locations within United States may close at different
time epochs. In particular, generators producing to two
different markets (such as CAISO and PJM) may find it
difficult to optimize over the two markets, given limited
information on the eventual trading price.
By utilizing historical day ahead market bids, firms
can usually obtain a good estimate of the market statistic
but decisions made in the absence of full information are
often suboptimal.
An informal definition for second chance, first intro-
duced in [14], is when a firm is not restricted to one mar-
ket, and can participate in a second or later market as an
insurance for risky behavior in the first market. Second
chance improves ones’ profit as compared to not being
able to access two markets at the same time.
We model this via temporally connected markets,
and whether we have full information of the later market
(in which case we can effectively take part in both mar-
kets), or we do not know the realization of the second
market (in which case there is no second chance and the
firm optimizes over past statistics of the behavior of the
later market, and is unable to use the second market as
an effective source of insurance).
In this work, under stochasticity on the maximal
price of the market, we show that given statistics and for
the firm possibly participating in both markets, it should
participate according to the mean of the random vari-
able, as per intuition. The variance does not play a role
in making optimal decisions as it potentially affects both
in a positive and negative manner. Furthermore, we look
at how second chance can improve the firm’s profit, and
how they affect the profit of other firms in the system.
1.3 Literature Review
Our work builds on, and contributes to, three related
literatures: i) works studying platform design and, ii)
works studying competition in networked markets.
1.3.1. Platform design The widespread success of on-
line platforms has spurred on an increasingly growing
literature focused on understanding the impacts of dif-
ferent designs of platforms and their successes. Work
in this literature has focused on a variety of topics, e.g.
pricing [15], insulation [16] and competition [17] .
Our focus is on distinguishing platforms or markets
based on the information they provide, and this can be
either temporal as in the power market setting, or plat-
form design in general, with the preference of withhold-
ing full information.
To this point, no analytic work has studied the impact
of strategic incentives created by information or tem-
poral interactions in online platforms. This paper pro-
vides the first such study, using the classical model of
networked Cournot competition as the setting.
1.3.2. Competition in networked settings Networked
competition appears in various forms, including net-
worked Bertrand competition, e.g., [18, 19, 20, 21], net-
worked Cournot competition, e.g., [8, 9, 22], and various
other non-cooperative bargaining games where agents
can trade via bilateral contracts and a network deter-
mines the set of feasible trades, e.g., [23, 24, 25, 26, 27].
Our paper fits squarely into the emerging literature
on networked Cournot competition. The model of net-
worked competition we study has been considered pre-
viously, beginning with [28] and continuing through
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[22, 8, 9, 29, 10, 11, 12]. The contribution of our work
comes in two forms. Firstly, we show that withhold-
ing information in an appropriate manner can preserve
competition, i.e. firms react according to the average
case. If information can be withheld selectively, this
may drive production rates up, which has been shown
by [11, 12] to help improve efficiency in the platform.
Secondly, we also show that every player gains with
one player’s improved information, which is a good evi-
dence towards sharing of knowledge between players in
a truthful manner. In a recent work, [30] showed under a
different model that as variance in market clearing price
increases, the benefit of information also increase.
1.4 Summary
We introduce a novel model in Section 2 for
temporally connected networked Cournot competition,
whereby participants in both markets are only given a
statistic of the later market, the mean and variance of
the maximal price of that market. In Section 3, we show
that the optimal participation in the random market fol-
lows according to the participation with the mean of the
random variable, and is independent of the variance of
the random variable. We provide a motivating example
in Section 4, intuiting the behavior of a single firm under
second chance and provide generalizations on the result
and global effects in Section 5 where there is competi-
tion, showing that the profit of both firms in the earlier
and later market increase on average. Lastly, we prove
in Section 6 that the firm participating in second chance
always stand to gain from its participation or having in-
creased information, and conclude in Section 8.
2. Model
This paper adopts the model of networked Cournot
competition introduced by [8] and [9]. This model gen-
eralizes classical Cournot competition, in which firms
compete in a single market.
Our interest in this work is in Cournot competition in
a networked setting, and in addition, to consider tempo-
ral interactions between firms and markets. Specifically,
we consider a set M of m markets and a set F of n firms
that are connected by a set of edges E ⊆ F ×M, where
(i, j) ∈ E represents firm i having access to market j.
For (i, j) ∈ E , the production qi j ≥ 0 is the supply
from firm i to market j. The total production of a firm i
is si = ∑ j:(i, j)∈E qi j, and the total supply at market j
is d j = ∑i:(i, j)∈E qi j. (One can consider qi j = 0 for all
(i, j) /∈ E , and from this point on we will drop the range
(i, j) ∈ E for summations.) We use q to represent the
vector of productions (qi j)(i, j)∈E . Additionally, we use
s−i to denote the vector (s1, . . . ,si−1,si+1, . . . ,sn), and
similarly for q−i, j.
The price in a market is determined by the total sup-
ply through a demand function. Following [8], we focus
on linear inverse demand throughout this paper. Specif-
ically, the price p j at market j is given by α j − β jd j,
where α j and β j are market specific parameters. The
demand curve of market j characterizes the price p j as
a function of demand d j. As in [8], a firm experiences a
production cost that is quadratic in its total production,
i.e., firm i’s cost is cis2i , with ci being a firm specific pa-
rameter. Note that analytical characterizations outside
of linear demand and quadratic production costs are typ-
ically difficult. See [9] for a discussion.
2.1 Temporally Connected Markets Modeled
by Stochasticity
We introduce a slight change that markets can have a
stochastic α (maximal willingness to pay) value, intro-
ducing some stochasticity into the model:
p j(d j) = (α j + z)−β jd j,
where z is a random variable. The choice of the stochas-
ticity on the maximal willingness to pay α and not the
price elasticity β is because price elasticity in a market
is often kept constant while price peaks occur due to in-
creased demand.
The assumption is that all other firms observe the re-
alization and achieve equilibrium (existence and unique-
ness of equilibrium comes from the work of [8, 9]). We
limit our consideration currently to two temporal mar-
kets, one earlier and one later, with second chance being
modeled via one firm’s participation in both markets and
knowing the realization of the random variable z while
not participating in second chance implies that the firm
has to make a commitment to the quantity produced for
the later market based on information on z.
3. Optimization under market uncertainty
When a firm is given only the statistic of the market
behavior (and the information of the reported cost of the
other firms) and wants to make a decision, it optimizes
over the markets it participates in, knowing how its par-
ticipation would change the equilibrium in each market,
given the realization of random markets.
We hope that the random variable is well-behaved,
where we mean that decisions can be made independent
of the variance of the random variable. We restrict
our consideration to the case where only one firm
potentially participates in second chance, and prove the
following lemma:
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Lemma 1. When there is only one firm participating
in second chance, the solution of the optimal expected
profit from a market with random α is the solution to the
optimal profit from a market with the mean of α.
Proof. Note first that the quantity that the other firms
produce (observing the realization) can be written in
closed form as a function of the choice of the “second
chance” firm’s quantity to that market.
Given the “second chance” firm’s fixed committed
quantity to that market, the firms equivalently see a mar-
ket with αnewm (qsc) = αoldm −βm ∗qsc. Since each of these
firms only participate in one market, the first order con-
ditions hold and can be written:
αnewm −βmS−βmqi = 2ciqi,
where S = ∑ fi=1 qi. and therefore, for any two firms i, k,
(βm+2ci)qi = (βm+2ck)qk,
and so we can write every firms’ quantity as a function
of the quantity of the first firm q1, i.e. qi =
βm+2c1
βm+2ci
q1,
and therefore qi =
(βm+2ci)−1
∑k∈m[(βm+2ck)−1]
S. Denote ki = (βm+
2ci)−1, then we have that:
S(qscm ) =
αnew
βm+
(
1
∑ j k j
) ,
where αnewm = αoldm −βmqscm . Note that optimizing based
on the expected profit over the variable z, we have:
max
qsc1 ,q
sc
2
qsc1 (α1−β1(S1(qsc1 )+qsc1 ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue from first market
+
+qsc2 Ez[α2+ z−β2(Sz(qsc2 )+qsc2 )︸ ︷︷ ︸
price in market
]
− c(qsc1 +qsc2 )2
(1)
where the expected price in the market is
Ez[α2+ z−β2(Sz(qsc2 )+qsc2 )]
= α2−β2qsc2 +Ez[z−β2(Sz(qsc2 ))]
= α2−β2qsc2 +Ez
z−β2
 αnew2 + z
β2+
(
1
∑ j k j
)

= α2−β2qsc2 −
β2αnew2
β2+
(
1
∑ j k j
)
+Ez
z−β2
 z
β2+
(
1
∑ j k j
)

= α2−β2qsc2 −
β2αnew2
β2+
(
1
∑ j k j
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
price of market with z=0
(2)
and we have that the optimal action to take is to maxi-
mize based on the mean of the random variable. There-
fore, optimizing over this randomness results in reacting
in a Nash sense to a game without randomness where
the firm is given only the mean.
While the proof and lemma above is for the one firm
case, the proof trivially extends to the multi-firm case
participating in both, where they would both still react
according to the mean, even if they are given different
variances.
4. Motivating Example: Second chance in
the absence of competition
To provide intuition, we start out with the one firm,
two market case, whereby the first market is determinis-
tic and the second market is random and in this example,
we assume that the random variable z is bernoulli, and
defined in the following manner:
z =
{
1 with probability 12
−1 with probability 12
As we already know from the preceding section, the op-
timal solution with no knowledge of the realization is to
allocate quantities according to the mean, i.e. E[z] = 0.
On the other hand, for second chance, the optimal so-
lution is with knowledge of realizations. We first com-
pute the amount that the firm commits to the second
market when there is no knowledge of the realization.
Note that in general, the second chance firm contributes
a non-zero aggregate supply to both markets, and that
implies that all first order conditions are active. We list
here some other possibilities:
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1. q1 > 0,q2 > 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 > 0. This corresponds to
the traditional case whereby participation to each
market regardless of the market conditions remain
active, and all first order conditions hold. In partic-
ular, the following equation, summarizing the first
order conditions, hold true.
2c(q1+q2) = α1−2β1q1 = α2−2β2q2
which gives us that aggregate supply s can be writ-
ten:
s = q1+q2 =
α1β2+α2β1
2(cβ1+ cβ2+β1β2)
which allow us to find that the equilibrium quanti-
ties at each market with no second chance will be
as follow:
q1 =
1
2β1
(α1−2cs) , q2 = 12β2 (α2−2cs)
with corresponding prices in each market as:
p1 =
1
2
(α1+2cs) , p2 =
1
2
(α2+2cs) ,
Then, the profit of the firm can be written as:
Π=
1
4β1
(α21−4c2s2)+
1
4β2
(α22−4c2s2)− cs2
Similarly, under second chance or full information,
the good profit and bad profit can be written by re-
placing α2 with α2±1, denoted α+2 , α−2 :
Πg =
1
4β1
(α21−4c2s2g)+
1
4β2
[(α+2 )
2−4c2s2g]− cs2g
Πb =
1
4β1
(α21−4c2s2b)+
1
4β2
[(α−2 )
2−4c2s2b]− cs2b
where sg = s +
β1
2(cβ1+cβ2+β1β2)
and sb = s −
β1
2(cβ1+cβ2+β1β2)
and the profit from second chance
is its expectation over all possible realizations
Π(sc) = 12 (Πg+Πb), and now we show thatΠ
(sc) >
Π, whereΠ as we know from the preceding section
equals that when the firm optimizes without knowl-
edge of the realization of z:
Π(sc)−Π= 1
4β1
[−4c2( s
2
g+ s
2
b
2
− s2)]
+
1
4β2
[1−4c2( s
2
g+ s
2
b
2
− s2)]
− c( s
2
g+ s
2
b
2
− s2)
> 0
with
s2g+s
2
b
2 − s2 < 0 following from convexity.
α2
α2α2+1α2-1 αc α’
q2
q1
q
Figure 1: Scenario 2: q1 > 0,q2 > 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 = 0.
Second market is participated in the good setting
and in the mean case but not under the bad setting.
2. q1 > 0,q2 > 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 = 0. In this case, when the
market returns in the bad case, the firm, if partici-
pating in second chance, chooses not to participate
at all. One can still follow the pipeline of the previ-
ous analysis, and find that q1 is linearly decreasing
in α2 while q2 the opposite if q1,q2 > 0. However,
we are discussing here a particular case where q2
reduces to zero when α2 is small enough, say, falls
below a threshold αc, as Fig. 1 shows.
Conspicuously, under this circumstance we have
Πsc =
Πg+Πb
2
=
Πα2+1+Πα2−1
2
=
Πα2+1+Παc
2
≥ Πα′ +Παc
2
>Πα2 =Π
where α′ = 2α2−αc. The third equation holds as
the market equilibrium (single-firm-single-market
equilibrium) remains invariant for any α2 ≤ αc.
The fourth inequality is always true since Π is
monotonically increasing in α2. Finally the fifth
inequality follows the conclusion of the previous
case.
3. q1 > 0,q2 = 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 = 0. This is basically an-
other situation that follows case 2, as illustrated in
Fig. 2. With both α2−1 and α2, the firm only par-
ticipates in the first market, i.e., q1 > 0,q2 = 0,q
g
2 >
0,qb2 = 0. SinceΠb =Πα2−1 =Παc =Πα2 =Π, in-
tuitively Πsc = Πg+Πb2 >Π.
4. q1 > 0,q2 = 0,q
g
2 = 0,q
b
2 = 0
The firm only participates in the first market and ig-
nore the second one regardless of α2, it will neither
gain nor lose.
5. q1 = 0,q2 > 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 > 0
The firm only participates in the second market and
ignore the first one regardless of α2, thus
s = q2 =
α2
2(c+β2)
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α2
α2α2+1α2-1 αc
q2
q1
q
Figure 2: Scenario 3: q1 > 0,q2 = 0,q
g
2 > 0,q
b
2 = 0.
Second market is participated in the good setting
but not in the mean case nor the bad setting.
with price
p2 = α2−β2s
We can therefore have
Π= α2s−β2s2− cs2
Similarly,
Πg = (α2+1)sg−β2s2g− cs2g
Πb = (α2−1)sb−β2s2b− cs2b
where sg = s+ 12(c+β2) and sb = s−
1
2(c+β2)
. It is
trivial to verify
Πsc−Π= 1
2(c+β2)
− (β2+ c)(
s2g+ s
2
b
2
− s2)> 0
since
s2g+s
2
b
2 − s2 < 0 holds through convexity.
To sum up, excluding case 4 where we can ignore the
second market a priori, profit is expected to increase and
the firm stands to gain with second chance. Note that
with this analysis, we also know that on average, profit
increases in this non-competition case as long as z is
governed by a symmetric probability distribution with
mean 0, i.e., the p.d.f. of the function is symmetric
around 0.
In the succeeding sections, we will make the assump-
tion that the first order conditions hold true with equal-
ity, i.e. every link is active which implies that in every
scenario, the firm would always participate in the market
it is linked to.
5. Global Effects on other Firms
We have already noticed that participation in second
chance changes the α value that the other firms see. In
general now, we show that in markets that have firms
that participate in only one market, as α increases,
we show that profits in every firm does too. Again,
while we show this for the case where only one firm
potentially participates in second chance, this extends
(in a tedious manner) to the case where multiple firms
participate in second chance together.
Lemma 2. In a single market, with firms participat-
ing only in that particular market, as α increases, every
firm’s revenue increase, and vice versa. In particular, it
increases as a quadratic function of the variable α.
Proof. Firstly, note from the above analysis that when
every firm participates only in that market, the quantity
can be written:
qi =
ki
∑ j k j
S
where ki = (β+2ci)−1 and
S =
α
β+ 1∑k j
where the eventual price of the market is:
p(α) = α−βS
= α− αβ
β+ 1∑k j
=
α
∑k j
β+ 1∑k j
We can write the revenue of the firm as a function of
the maximal willingness to pay in each market α:
Ri(α) = qi
( α
∑k j
β+ 1∑k j
)
=
ki
∑ j k j
(
α
β+ 1∑k j
)( α
∑k j
β+ 1∑k j
)
=
ki
(∑ j k j)2
(
α
β+ 1∑k j
)(
α
β+ 1∑k j
)
=
α2ki
(∑ j k j)2(β+ 1∑k j )
2
and we see that as α increases, the revenue at equilib-
rium for each firm increases, and if α decreases, then the
revenue at equilibrium for each firm decreases. More-
over, we note that revenue of each of these firms can be
written as a quadratic function of α.
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Lemma 3. Given α1, α2, the middle firm participates
in each market with the corresponding quantities:
q1 =
α1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
−α2
(
c
β2
)
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c
q2 =
α2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
where Mm =
1− βm
βm+
(
1
∑ j∈m k j
)
.
In particular, this participation is linear in terms of
α2, and therefore any change in α2 would correspond-
ingly result in a linear change in the αnew2 seen by the
other firms.
Proof. When only one firm participates in second
chance, then it knows exactly how the other firms will
react according to the equation:
Sm(qm) =
αm−βmqm
βm+
(
1
∑ j∈m k j
)
and price at each market can correspondingly be written:
pm(qm) = αm−βmSm(qm)−βqm
and the optimal profit problem can be written:
max
q1,q2
q1 p1(q1)+q2 p2(q2)− c(q1+q2)2
and taking derivatives with respect to qm, we get:
2c(qm+q−m) = (αm−2βmqm)
1− βm
βm+
(
1
∑ j∈m k j
)

i.e. setting Mm =
1− βm
βm+
(
1
∑ j k j
)
, we can write:
q1 =
α1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
−α2
(
c
β2
)
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c
(3)
q2 =
α2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
(4)
5.1 Effects on the other participants in the
later market
Lemma 4. The αnew2 observed by the other firms in the
second market can be written as:
αreal2 −β2
αobs2 M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c

where αreal2 is the realized α2 and α
obs
2 is what the mid-
dle firm observes, and is dependent on whether there is
second chance or not. Regardless, αnew2 is a linear func-
tion of α2.
Proof. Follows from the result in the preceding Lemma.
When there is no second chance, the quantity that the
middle firm produces for each market remains fixed as
qm(α2), while if there is second chance, then the quan-
tity produced is a function of the realized random vari-
able qm(α2+ z).
In particular,
αsc2 =α2+z−β2
 (α2+ z)M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
 ,
and
αnsc2 = α2+ z−β2
α2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
 ,
and expected revenue increase can be written as:
ki
(∑ j k j)2(β2+ 1∑k j )
2
Ez
[
(αsc2 )
2− (αnsc2 )2
]
and can be simplified to be:
ki
L2
[
2P+P2
] ·Var[z]
where
Lm = (∑
j∈m
k j)2
(
βm+
1
∑ j∈m k j
)2
and
P =
β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
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When there is second chance, qi as a function of z can
be written:
qsci =
ki
(
α2+ z−β2
(
(α2+z)M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
))
(∑ j∈m k j)
(
β2+ 1∑ j∈m k j
)
while when there is no second chance, the participation
of the middle firm becomes fixed and qi as a function of
z becomes:
qnsci =
ki
(
α2+ z−β2
(
α2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
−α1
(
c
β1
)
2β2M2
(
1+ cβ1M1
)
+2c
))
(∑ j∈m k j)
(
β2+ 1∑ j∈m k j
)
and we are interested in the quantity E[ci(qsci )2] −
(E[ci(qnsci )2]):
E[ci(qsci )2]− (E[ci(qnsci )2]) = ci
(
k2i (2P+P
2)
L2
)
Var[z]
and whether a profit is made depends on whether:
ki− cik2i > 0⇐⇒ 1 > ciki
but ciki = ciβ+2ci <
1
2 , and therefore, we obtain the
following theorem:
Theorem 5. A profit is always made by the other firms in
the random (later) market under increased information
or second chance.
5.2 Effects on the other participants in the ear-
lier market
Lemma 6. The αnew1 observed by the other firms in the
first market can be written as:
α1−β1
α1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
−αobs2
(
c
β2
)
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c

and consequently, αnew1 is a linear function of α2, with a
positive coefficient, indicating that as α2 increases (de-
creases), αnew1 also increases (decreases).
Proof. Follows from the result in Lemma 3.
Similar to before, the revenue of each firm participat-
ing in the first market can be written:
Ri(αnew1 ) =
(αnew1 )
2ki
(∑ j k j)2(β1+ 1∑k j )
2
How does the random variable z affect αnew1 ? From
Lemma 5, we can see that as changes in z reflect in lin-
ear changes in αnew1 in the opposite direction. Unlike the
previous subsection, here we only have an indirect effect
and no direct effect. When the middle firm participates
in second chance, the coefficient of the quadratic term
of z can be written:
ki
L1
β1
 cβ2
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c
2
On the other hand, if the middle firm does not, then there
is no effect on the earlier market, and therefore with sec-
ond chance, revenue increases by:
ki
L1
β1
 cβ2
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c
2 ·Var[z]
On the other hand, we can write the difference in cost:
cik2i
L1
β1
 cβ2
2β1M1
(
1+ cβ2M2
)
+2c
2 ·Var[z]
and whether a profit is made depends on whether:
ki− cik2i > 0⇐⇒ 1 > ciki
but ciki = ciβ+2ci <
1
2 , and we get the following theorem:
Theorem 7. A profit is always made by the other firms
in the fixed (earlier) market under second chance.
6. Benefits of Participation in Second
Chance
We restrict ourselves, as we did in the previous sec-
tions, in cases where only one firm has the option to
participate in Second Chance. The question we want to
ask in this section is whether it is always the case, as it is
with the motivating examples in Section 4, that the firm
with the opportunity to participate in second chance im-
proves profit through participation. Recall from the pre-
vious section that we already have closed form solutions
for the firm’s participation in the two markets depen-
dent on the whether it participates in Second Chance.
Firstly, it is important to note that the eventual price of
the two markets is linearly dependent of the firm’s par-
ticipation (since the αm seen here is linearly dependent
on the firm’s participation), and can be written:
pm(qm) = αm−βm αm−βmqm
βm+
(
1
∑ j∈m k j
) −βmqm
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Similar to before in Section 4, we can write:
δ1 =
−M2c
2AB+2Ac+2Bc
, δ2 =
M2(A+ c)
2AB+2Ac+2Bc
where A= β1M1 and B= β2M2, and again, we can have:
∆p1 =−Aδ1, ∆p2 =−Bδ2+M2
and similar to before,
Π(sc)−Π=∆p1δ1+∆p2δ2− c(δ1+δ2)2
=D[−Ac2−B(A+ c)2
+2(A+ c)(AB+Ac+Bc)− cA2]
=D[(A+ c)(AB+Ac+Bc)]> 0
since D = M
2
2
2(AB+Ac+Bc)2 > 0, and therefore profit in-
creases in the general case, as compared to the illustra-
tion in section 4, culminating in the following theorem:
Theorem 8. Every firm improves its profit when the firm
exercises second chance, i.e., more information for one
firm is beneficial for all parties in this system.
7. Effects of Information on Social Wel-
fare
An interesting direction for this work is whether
withheld information or information asymmetry can im-
prove social welfare. We perform simulations where
there is one firm potentially participating in second
chance, and we are interested in the ratio of the social
welfare obtained with and without second chance.
In this set of simulations, we consider the case where
there are three firms in total, one firm participating in
each of the two markets exclusively and one firm partic-
ipating in both markets. We assume that z is bernoulli as
defined in section 4. Similar to our analysis, we are in-
terested in the case where there are two markets and the
choice of three firms is firstly the smallest to represent
this setting and because firms in a particular knowledge
group can be aggregated and seen as one firm.
Is the social welfare, alike to the individual profits,
always increasing with second chance? Given results
from [11], social welfare at Nash usually suffers due to
decreased production levels, and information withheld
may improve or degrade production levels, and therefore
could potentially be used to improve social welfare.
Under 10000 simulated scenarios as described above
with the parameters α, β, and c being chosen uniformly
at random, we plot in Fig.3 the ratio between the av-
erage social welfare obtained with and without second
chance. As anticipated, the ratio ranges from roughly 14
to 4, signifying that the average social welfare can pos-
sibly be improved (but also possibly made worse) under
information asymmetry.
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Figure 3: Simulations illustrating the range of social
welfare obtained, possibly better or worse with
additional information. The results are sorted for
the reader’s convenience.
8. Conclusion and Future Work
In this work, we introduce stochasticity in Net-
worked Cournot Competition to take into account mar-
kets at different times, such as between geographical lo-
cations at distinct timezones or even between day-ahead
or real-time trading in power markets.
Emphasizing on power markets, we focus on the
two market case and include stochasticity in the second
(later) market. We consider one firm potentially being
able to access the two markets, in two different cases:
(i) the firm knows the statistics of the random variable,
and (ii) the firm realizes the random variable.
We find that with second chance or with precise in-
formation, both the firm involved and the other firms in
the system increase their expected profit.
Lastly, we also show simulations that demonstrate
that withholding information can make the system bet-
ter or worse in terms of social welfare, and the careful
design of how to and to whom to withhold information
from is a good future direction to consider.
Another interesting direction to consider is incorpo-
rating different costs of participating in distinct markets.
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